1 Reber (1967) , who coined the term 'implicit learning', asked participants to study a series of letter strings such as VXVS for a few seconds each. Then he told them that these strings were all constructed according to a particular set of rules (that is, a grammar; see Figure 8 .1) and that in the test phase they would see some new strings and would have to decide which ones conformed to the same rules and which ones did not. Participants could make these decisions with better-than-chance accuracy but had little ability to describe the rules. For example, participants could not recall correctly which letters began and ended the strings. Reber described his results as a 'peculiar combination of highly efficient behavior with complex stimuli and almost complete lack of verbalizable knowledge about them' (p. 859). 2 In the 1950s, a number of studies asked people to generate words ad libitum and established that the probability with which they would produce, say, plural nouns was increased if each such word was reinforced by the experimenter saying 'umhmm' (e.g. Greenspoon, 1955) . This result occurred in subjects apparently unable to report the reinforcement contingency. 3 Svartdal (1991) presented participants with brief trains of between 4 and 17 auditory clicks. Participants immediately had to press a response button exactly the same number of times and were instructed that feedback would be presented when the number of presses matched the number of clicks. In fact, though, feedback was contingent on speed of responding: for some subjects, feedback was given when response speed was slower than in a baseline phase, while for others it was given when speed was faster. Svartdal obtained evidence of learning, in that speed adjusted appropriately to the reinforcement contingencies. But subjects seemed to be unaware that it was speed of responding that was important and believed instead that feedback depended, as the instructions had implied, on the number of responses. A structured questionnaire revealed no evidence of awareness of the contingency between response speed and feedback in subjects whose response rate had adjusted appropriately. Reber (1967) 4 Clark and Squire (1998) reported that people can acquire conditioned eyeblink responses even when unaware of the relationship between the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US). In their procedure one CS, say a tone, predicted a puff of air to the eye while another, say a white noise, did not. Participants watched a silent movie while the conditioning trials were presented. Conditioning was indexed as a relative increase in the likelihood of making a preparatory eyeblink response to the tone compared to the white noise. Clark and Squire reported equivalent conditioning under some circumstances in participants who could report the stimulus contingencies as in those who could not. 5 Karni (1996) describes experiments in which participants learned an extremely low-level texture discrimination skill. On each of many training trials a display was presented in which some lines were oriented differently from the rest and participants tried to judge whether these target lines were above or adjacent to each other. The display was masked after a varying, brief, interval. Initially, participants required the mask to be delayed by about 140 ms in order to make these judgments, but after several daily training sessions this was reduced to approximately 40 ms, a remarkable speed-up in a visual discrimination skill which, one might assume, is already massively overlearned. As Karni notes (p. 41), 'one would have expected that during the course of normal development, indeed as a result of everyday experience, this task would be perfected to the limit'. Another surprising finding is that this skill is highly specific: for instance, it was very local in a retinotopic sense. If the target appeared only a small distance away from a previously trained visual field location, little benefit of training was observed. Although Karni does not report his participants' insight into their learning, it seems extremely unlikely that they were aware of this specificity. 6. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) asked passers-by to examine four identical pairs of nylon stockings and to say which was the best quality and why. In Nisbett and Wilson's own words: 'There was a pronounced left-to-right position effect, such that the right-most object in the array was heavily over-chosen … with the right-most stockings being preferred over the left-most by a factor of almost four to one. When asked about the reasons for their choices, no subject ever mentioned spontaneously the position of the article in the array. And, when asked directly about a possible effect of the position of the article, virtually all subjects denied it, usually with a worried glance at the interviewer suggesting that they felt either that they had misunderstood the question or were dealing with a madman' (pp. 243-4) . They seem to have learned a position bias that affected their choice behavior unconsciously. 7 A densely amnesic individual, E.P., was asked to study a list of words for 3 seconds each (Hamann & Squire, 1997) . Five minutes later a memory test was given in which E.P. was shown the words he had just seen randomly intermixed with some new words and he had to recognize the ones he had studied. He performed at chance (50% correct) on this test, which is characteristic of amnesic individuals: damage to the medial temporal lobe, especially the hippocampus, renders performance on standard memory tests such as recall and recognition very difficult. In another test, however, E.P.'s performance was entirely different and suggested perfectly normal memory. Again he first studied a list of words but in this case after 5 minutes he was given a perceptual identification test. On this task, words that were studied previously and new words were presented one at a time extremely briefly (i.e. for less than a tenth of a second) on the display and E.P.'s task was simply to identify them aloud. Priming is demonstrated if the percentage of studied words identified correctly is greater than the percentage of unstudied words identified correctly. E.P. showed completely normal priming. Thus it appears that he had learned the words presented in the study phase, but they were not represented in a form that allowed conscious access in the recognition test. They were in a form that did allow access on the priming test, however. 8 In a variant of Reber's artificial grammar learning experiment, Dienes and Altmann (1997) asked participants to study letter strings generated from a grammar and then asked them to judge whether new strings conformed or not to the same rules. The novel aspect of the task was that participants had to report how confident they were in each of these decisions using a scale from 'complete guess' to 'completely confident'. Dienes and Altmann found that participants performed with better-than-chance accuracy in judging the well-formedness of test strings even on those trials where they claimed to be purely guessing. They plainly had learned something about the rules governing stimulus structure but were unaware of their own ability to apply this knowledge to new cases. 9 In the serial reaction time (SRT) task, which together with Reber's grammar, learning procedure has become a paradigmatic method of studying implicit learning, a target such as a dot appears in one of several possible locations on a computer display and the participant presses as fast as possible a response key assigned to that location. Instead of appearing at random across a series of trials, however, the target follows a predictable or partially predictable sequence of locations. Learning is measured chronometrically by changing the sequence after a number of training blocks; an increase in reaction time (RT) on the transfer sequence is evidence that participants learned something about the training sequence and were using their knowledge to anticipate the target location on each trial, thus achieving rapid RTs. This learning, however, generally is not consciously available. For instance, Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001) asked participants to 'report' their conscious knowledge of the sequence by pressing keys in a way that reproduced the sequence and found that under some circumstances they were unable to do this.
What do these examples have in common? First, they involve situations in which the primary task the person engages in is something other than deliberately, explicitly, trying to learn about the contingencies programmed by the experimenter. For instance, in Reber's artificial grammar learning (AGL) task, all that participants are told in the learning phase is that they should try to memorize a series of letter strings. They are not told to try to work out the rules governing the structure of these strings. Hence any evidence that they have indeed learned these rules would suggest that learning was incidental or unintentional. This focus on unintentional learning has been quite important in the historical development of research on learning and memory as it came against a background in which research on explicit, deliberative learning was dominant. When Reber began his studies in the 1960s, most ideas about learning were rooted in notions of explicit hypothesis-testing (e.g. Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Hunt, Marin, & Stone, 1966) .
Secondly, the examples have in common the implication that learning can be dissociated from awareness. Participants were shown in these situations to have learned something -to have their behavior controlled by a variable -of which they were apparently unaware. In most of the cases awareness is assumed to be synonymous with 'verbally reportable'. This is not the only method by which awareness might be gauged, though. In example 7, awareness was measured by means of a recognition test on the assumption that such a test requires conscious access to stored information.
Research on implicit learning has become a major topic in the landscape of experimental psychology in the last few years. For example, in the 1980s there were only 15 journal articles with this term in their title or abstract (according to the combined Science and Social Sciences Citation Indexes), but this number jumped to 253 during the 1990s. Moreover, the implicit/explicit learning distinction is largely synonymous with other terms such as procedural/declarative (Cohen & Squire, 1980) , which have themselves generated sizable research literatures. The procedural/declarative distinction has been especially influential in neuroscience and is discussed in more depth by Knowlton in the present volume (see Chapter 16). Implicit learning has been extensively reviewed in books by Reber (1993) , Berry and Dienes (1993) , Cleeremans (1993) , Stadler and Frensch (1998) , and French and Cleeremans (2002) .
In this chapter I consider whether examples such as these do genuinely establish the existence of a form of learning that is both unintentional and unconscious. A variety of issues, both conceptual and methodological, have emerged in the evaluation of this area and have led to some debate about the conclusions that are licensed by demonstrations such as those given above. Another issue I consider is whether implicit and explicit learning should be thought of as separate and independent mechanisms or as different manifestations of a common underlying learning system. I also briefly consider some of the computational mechanisms that have been explored as accounts of the basic processes underlying implicit learning.
UNINTENTIONAL AND AUTOMATIC LEARNING
There can be little dispute that learning is possible even under conditions of reduced attention. Numerous studies demonstrate that people can become sensitive to informational structure even when they are not deliberately trying to learn that structure and when they are engaging in other simultaneous mental activities. For example, Shanks and Johnstone (1999) required a group of participants to perform the SRT task described above (example 9) in combination with a tonecounting task for 14 blocks of trials each comprising 8 cycles of a 12-location repeating sequence. For the secondary tone-counting task, the computer generated a tone after each correct target location response that was randomly determined to be either low or high and participants were instructed to count the number of high tones emitted during each block of trials. At the end of each block, participants were asked to provide their count and feedback presented at the end of the block encouraged them to count the tones accurately (participants were excluded from the analysis if they made more than 10% errors on average). When the underlying sequence was changed on block 15, RTs increased significantly, suggesting that the sequential structure had been learned in the preceding blocks. This seems to be a good case of unintentional learning in that (a) participants were not told anything about possible sequential regularities in the target movements and (b) they were occupied with a demanding secondary task.
However, the finding that reductions in attention to an environment do not abolish learning does not tell us about two slightly different but perhaps more pertinent questions: (1) are there learning tasks in which reductions in attentional allocation have no detectable impact on learning? and (2) are there situations in which completely unattended information can still induce learning? The answers to these questions are somewhat less clear. Data obtained by Shanks and Channon (2002) reveal that divided attention does have a detrimental effect on sequence learning even if it does not abolish it. The disruption caused by introducing a transfer sequence was not as great in a dual-task group as in one that had performed the SRT task without the secondary tonecounting task (see Figure 8 .2). Moreover, the fact that learning occurred in the dual-task group in Shanks and Johnstone's study does not answer the second question as we cannot be sure (and it is rather unlikely) that the tone-counting task was so taxing as to leave no attentional capacity for sequence learning. Thus the data do not answer these central questions.
I shall not attempt to review all of the relevant literature here (Goschke, 1997 , provides an extensive review), but shall instead present a few examples of representative findings.
1 With regard to the first question, many studies have asked whether sequence learning in the SRT task (see example 9 above) is affected by concurrent secondary tasks that can be assumed to reduce participants' ability to intentionally learn the relevant sequence. Although tone-counting does appear to have an effect, other tasks do not. For example, Heuer and Schmidtke (1996) pointed out that the tone-counting task has two components, memorizing the current number of tones and classifying each tone as high or low. They therefore tried to tease these components apart. They found that sequence learning in the SRT task was completely unaffected by two secondary tasks (the verbal and visuo-spatial tasks of Brooks, 1967) that impose a memory load without additional stimulus processing, whereas it was affected by a task (pressing a foot pedal in response to a high-pitched but not a low-pitched tone) requiring stimulus processing without a memory load. On the assumption that the Brooks secondary tasks were to some degree attention-demanding, Heuer and Schmidtke's data represent quite strong evidence that sequence learning in the SRT task does not require central attentional resources: so long as an appropriate secondary task is used (i.e. one that does not require stimulus processing in the response-stimulus interval of the main task), Figure 8 .2 Mean reaction times across blocks of trials in Shanks and Channon's (2002) no interference of sequence learning will be observed. Pointing to the same conclusion, Jiménez and Méndez (1999) used a probabilistic sequence learning task in which the target stimulus could be one of four symbols; as well as reacting to the location of each target, dual-task participants had to count the frequency of two of the symbols. This secondary task had no detectable effect on sequence learning. Jiménez and Méndez speculated that the use of a probabilistic sequence was critical in their study for revealing a form of learning that is independent of attention. It is interesting that this secondary task did require stimulus processing to identify each symbol and therefore, on Heuer and Schmidtke's account, would have been expected to be disruptive. However, the obvious difference is that a task like tone-counting requires processing of stimuli that are irrelevant and additional to the primary task, whereas in Jiménez and Méndez's procedure the processing required by the secondary task (symbol counting) concerned stimuli that had to be processed anyway in the service of the primary targetdetection task.
There is, hence, some evidence to support the claim that reductions in attentional capacity can be incurred without detectable cost on implicit learning and this plainly supports the idea that the latter is, to some extent, unintentional and automatic.
Another way to address the question of whether implicit learning is genuinely unintentional is to arrange a situation in which the experimental instructions require an individual to behave in a certain way but where implicitly acquired knowledge might cause them to behave in precisely the opposite way. For instance, my golf coach might explain to me how I should swing my golf club in a particular way and I might fully intend to do this but nevertheless find myself swinging in my old habitual manner instead. An ingrained habit seems to be able, in situations like this, to control my behavior even when it runs counter to my conscious intentions. A recent laboratory study by Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001) provides a nice example. These authors trained participants on a 4-choice SRT task in which the target again moved according to a repeating 12-element sequence. The learning phase consisted of 15 blocks of 96 trials for a total of 1440 trials. For half the participants there was a response-stimulus interval (RSI) of 250 ms between the execution of one response and the appearance of the next target while for the remainder the RSI was 0 ms. RTs reduced somewhat across blocks 1-12 in both groups. Then on block 13 the sequence was changed with the original sequence being reintroduced on blocks 14 and 15. Destrebecqz and Cleeremans found that RTs were significantly greater in the transfer block (block 13) and concluded that their participants had learned something about the sequence.
To ascertain whether this sequence knowledge was dependent or independent of intention, Destrebecqz and Cleeremans presented two tests following block 15. First, they informed participants that there had been a repeating sequence and asked them to generate a sequence of keypresses under both 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' conditions following the logic of opposition developed in the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993) . In the inclusion test participants were to try to reproduce the sequence they saw in training while in the exclusion test they were to avoid reproducing the training sequence or any of its parts. The key finding was that, at least for participants in the RSI ϭ 0 ms group, the sequence generated under exclusion conditions contained more chunks from the training sequence than would be expected by chance. Thus participants' sequence knowledge, Destrebecqz and Cleeremans argued, was divorced from intention in the sense that they could not exert voluntary control over it when explicitly required to exclude it in generating a sequence.
What about the second question above, whether completely unattended information can still induce learning? This issue raises some tricky methodological problems. For instance, it is hard to arrange for a stream of information to be unattended for any sustained period. This has become apparent in reevaluations of two apparently clear examples of implicit learning. Miller (1987) used the famous 'flanker' task to argue that unattended information can influence performance. In Miller's version of this task, participants saw a brief display of three letters, a central target and two flankers that were to be ignored. A display thus might be [V J V]. The participant's task was to identify the target and make an appropriate keypress. Miller arranged for the identity of the flankers to be correlated with the target such that specific flankers co-occurred regularly with targets requiring a specific response. For example, on 80% of occasions (valid trials) on which the flankers were the letter V, the target was one (such as J) that required a right-finger response. On the remaining 20% of trials (invalid), V was paired with a target requiring a left-finger response. Although the flankers were supposedly ignored, Miller found that RTs were reliably shorter on valid than invalid trials and interpreted this as evidence of automatic and inattentional processing of the flankers combined with implicit learning of the flanker-target correlations. Miller's evidence that the flankers were not attended was supported by the finding that participants could not subsequently recall the flankers, but this result was later questioned by Schmidt and Dark (1998) , who were unable to replicate the chance-level recall reported by Miller. Instead, they found very high levels of flanker recall and concluded that there was a failure of selective attention at some point during processing such that the flankers did receive attentional processing which in turn led to the formation of recallable memory traces.
In another much-cited study, Eich (1984) reported that participants picked up information about words presented in an unattended stream in a dichotic listening task. While shadowing a prose stream in the attended ear, word pairs that included a descriptor and a homophone, such as TAXI-FARE, were presented to the non-attended ear. Subsequently, participants (who performed at chance in a recognition test for the unattended words) were given a spelling test that included the homophones and were found to be more likely to spell them in their low-frequency form (i.e. FARE rather than FAIR) than would otherwise be expected. Eich concluded that that unattended word pairs had been implicitly encoded and caused subsequent priming in the spelling test. This conclusion was challenged by Wood, Stadler, and Cowan (1997) , however, who pointed out that the prose passage in the attended channel was presented by Eich at a very slow rate that would have made shadowing rather easy and hence might have allowed occasional shifts of attention to the unattended steam. To test this, Wood et al. replicated Eich's experiment but varied the presentation rate of the attended information. Under faster rates, which would be expected to reduce or eliminate shifts of attention, the critical homophone spelling bias was eliminated.
Overall, research on the possibility of unintended learning for unattended information is rather contradictory, with some well-studied lines of research, such as those on flanker effects and dichotic listening, being rather negative and others, for instance on the serial reaction time task (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Heuer & Schmidtke, 1996; Jiménez & Méndez, 1999) , being rather more encouraging. Plainly, further research is needed to reconcile these conflicting findings and to delineate precisely the conditions (if any) in which learning can be divorced from intention and attention.
AWARENESS AND IMPLICIT LEARNING
The case for implicit learning being unconscious depends crucially on the validity of the tests used to index awareness. A common distinction is drawn between 'subjective' and 'objective' tests, where the former ask the participant to report his or her state of awareness while the latter demand some forced-choice discrimination.
Verbalization
With regard to the former, there is absolutely no doubt that participants' verbal reports in implicit learning experiments often fail to incorporate all of the information that can otherwise be detected in their behavior, as many of the examples given at the beginning of the chapter illustrate. However, although such results establish that in at least one sense learning can be implicit, they may have a rather mundane explanation. Researchers who have considered the properties of tests of awareness (e.g. Reingold & Merikle, 1990; Shanks & St John, 1994) have pointed out (at least) two criteria that an adequate test of awareness must satisfy. First, it must be 'exhaustive', which means that the test must be sensitive to all of the conscious knowledge the participant is in possession of. Secondly, it must measure the same stored knowledge that is actually controlling behavior in the implicit measure (Shanks & St John called this the 'information' criterion; much earlier, Dulany, 1961 , made the same point under the label 'correlated hypotheses'). The exhaustiveness criterion is a problem for subjective tests of awareness because there is little to guarantee in such tests that the participant has indeed reported all available knowledge. For example, he or she may simply choose to withhold conscious knowledge held with low confidence. If that happens, then an implicit behavioral measure may dissociate from a subjective measure such as verbal report simply because the former is more sensitive to conscious knowledge. To avoid this problem, it would be necessary for the experimenter to induce and motivate the participant to report all relevant knowledge, including hunches and so on. This has not often been attempted. One way of achieving it is to force the participant to report a given number of pieces of information, a procedure that, when compared to unforced recall, can significantly improve performance (e.g. Schmidt & Dark, 1998) . Moreover, some studies that have probed quite thoroughly for all available verbalizable knowledge have even ended up finding that all knowledge is accessible for report (e.g. Marescaux, 1997) .
Tests of verbal awareness may be unsatisfactory not only because participants are insufficiently motivated to report low-confidence knowledge. There are many other ways in which they might lead to biased results. In case 4 above I described research that appears to demonstrate that classical conditioning may occur in the absence of awareness of the CS-US contingency. Although there has been a huge amount of research pointing to the same conclusion, a recent review ) questioned this claim. One of Lovibond and Shanks' main points was that the awareness tests used in studies like that of Clark and Squire (1998) often do not provide fair measures of CS -US contingency awareness. Clark and Squire's method of assessing awareness can be questioned on several grounds. First, the critical questions concerning CS-US contingencies (e.g. tone predicts shock, white noise predicts no shock) did not occur until after 28 other questions concerning other parts of the procedure, such as the silent movie participants watched during the experiment. Clearly this procedure may lead to underclassification of awareness due to forgetting and interference. Secondly, 17 true/false questions were used to classify awareness of the rather simple differential contingency. These questions were highly redundant and confusable, and participants were not able to change earlier answers. Five of the questions referred to the ordering of the two CSs (e.g. 'I believe the static noise and tone were always closely related in time'), which are of questionable relevance to ascertaining participants' knowledge of the CS-US relationships. Finally, the nominally correct answer was 'true' for only 4 of the 17 questions, further encouraging false positive responses. A participant who answered correctly to these four questions would need to resist answering yes to a large number of decoy questions to be classified as aware.
Thus tests of verbally reportable knowledge need to be scrutinized quite carefully to ensure that they do not introduce potential biasing factors. Lovibond and Shanks discuss many additional issues concerned with the measurement of subjective states of awareness. Results from conditioning experiments, although often not considered in the implicit learning literature, are quite striking. Bearing in mind that conditioning represents one of the simplest learning preparations imaginable, Lovibond and Shanks' conclusion -that conditioning does not occur without awareness -would seem to place a very major question mark over the possibility of learning without awareness. Further discussion of this controversial issue can be found in Wiens and Öhman (2002) , Manns, Clark, and Squire (2002) , and Shanks and Lovibond (2002) .
The information criterion
The information criterion is even more problematic for implicit learning studies. To see why this might be the case, consider Reber's artificial grammar learning experiment described in example 1 above. After studying letter strings generated from a grammar, participants performed with better-than-chance accuracy in judging the well-formedness of novel test strings. Figure 8 .1 presents an example of a grammar used to generate letter strings. Reber found, and many subsequent studies have confirmed (e.g. Dienes, Broadbent, & Berry, 1991) , that participants have great difficulty reporting the rules used to generate the strings (e.g. 'an initial T can be followed by any number of consecutive P's'). Let us assume that the elicitation of verbally reportable rules is exhaustive. Even so, the result only demonstrates unconscious learning if participants' ability to judge well-formedness is based on (implicit) knowledge of those rules. It might indeed be the case that abstract rules can be learned unconsciouslyReber has been quite persistent and forceful in defending this claim. For instance, Manza and Reber (1997: 75) wrote that This position is based on the argument that the complex knowledge acquired during an AG learning task is represented in a general, abstract form. The representation is assumed to contain little, if any, information pertaining to specific stimulus features; the emphasis is on structural relationships among stimuli. The key here is the notion that the mental content consists, not of the representation of specific physical forms, but of abstract representations of those forms.
However, it might equally be the case that wellformedness decisions are based on processes that have nothing to do with rule knowledge. There is now abundant evidence that the latter provides a more perspicuous way of understanding behavior in this task. The first compelling evidence for this (though see Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984) came from a study by Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) , who suggested that the only thing participants needed to learn in order to be able to make grammaticality decisions was the set of acceptable letter pairs (bigrams) that the grammar allows. They found that test performance was just as good in a group of participants who had only been trained on grammatical pairs of letters (e.g. TP) in the study phase as in participants who had seen complete strings. But if it is only knowledge of letter pairs that is responsible for performance, then it is mistaken to ask participants to report more complex rules. In fact, if participants are asked which bigrams are familiar, they are very accurate at doing this. In a further experiment, Perruchet and Pacteau trained participants on whole strings and then presented letter pairs in the test phase and asked participants to judge on a scale from 1 to 6 whether or not each pair had appeared in the training strings. The overall correlation between these judgments and the actual frequency of each letter pair was 0.61.
Thus the alternative to the rule-induction view of Reber is that participants merely focus on and learn about small letter chunks. In the test stage they endorse (i.e. call grammatical) any item composed mainly of familiar letter pairs. Two predictions that follows from this have been confirmed. First, if grammaticality and bigram familiarity are unconfounded in the test stage, it is familiarity rather than grammaticality that should control performance. Several experiments have tested this claim. Kinder and Assmann (2000) and Johnstone and Shanks (2001) examined it in artificial grammar experiments in which test items were either grammatical or ungrammatical, and orthogonally were made either of familiar or unfamiliar bigrams. Under these conditions, participants showed no tendency to endorse grammatical items more than ungrammatical ones; instead, they tended to call items grammatical if they were composed of familiar bigrams, regardless of their grammaticality. These results suggest that Reber's initial results were an artifact caused by the fact that his grammatical test items tended to be made of familiar bigrams while his ungrammatical items tended to be made of unfamiliar ones.
The second prediction is that it should be possible to trick participants into calling strings grammatical by making them feel more familiar. Kinder, Shanks, Cock, and Tunney (2003) succeeded in doing this via a small modification of the standard procedure. Participants initially studied strings of letters generated from a grammar. In the test phase, letter strings appeared (they were in fact all new grammatical strings) and participants decided whether each string was grammatical or ungrammatical. The strings were presented in a slightly unusual way on the computer display whereby they were initially masked by visual noise but gradually clarified (this is called 'perceptual clarification') over a period of a few seconds. Critically, some strings came into view slightly faster than others. After the string had clarified, the participant judged whether or not it was grammatical. The prediction was that the strings that clarified faster would be read slightly more fluently than the others. This should then have tricked the participants into increasing the likelihood of calling these strings grammatical, regardless of whether they were or not.
The results (see the left-hand side of Figure 8 .3) confirmed this prediction: a small but consistent increase in the probability of calling a string 'grammatical' occurred for the faster-clarifying strings, consistent with the view that fluency is an important cue to grammaticality decisions. Moreover, this 'fluency' effect was intentional in the sense that participants instructed to ignore differences in speed of clarification did not show the effect (see the righthand side of Figure 8.3) .
In summary, there is now a good deal of support for the idea that grammaticality decisions in these experiments are based on a mechanism that simply accumulates information about small-scale chunks and that uses this information to generate a feeling of familiarity; if this feeling is sufficiently strong, the string is called 'grammatical'. A number of connectionist models of grammar learning (Dienes, 1992; Kinder & Shanks, 2001 ) flesh out this approach in much greater deal.
Transfer
To be fair to Reber, there is another piece of evidence that seems to support his claim that rule knowledge governs performance in grammar learning experiments. This is the finding from 'transfer' tests that .
Participants studied strings of letters generated from a grammar. In the test phase, they judged whether new strings were grammatical or ungrammatical. The test strings were initially masked by visual noise but gradually clarified with 'fast' strings coming into view slightly more rapidly than 'slow' ones. The data on the left reveal that speed affected the probability of calling a string 'grammatical', consistent with a fluency account. The data on the right reveal that the effect was eliminated in participants instructed to ignore differences in speed of clarification.
when participants memorize items from one letter-set or modality, they can successfully classify test items presented in a different letter-set or modality (e.g. Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995) . The only common factor between training and test items is their underlying abstract structure. For example, Altmann et al. (1995) trained one group of participants on standard letter strings and a second group on sequences of tones, with both the letter strings and tone sequences conforming to the same rule structure. Thus each letter string had an equivalent tone sequence in which, for instance, the letter M was translated into a tone at the frequency of middle C. In the test phase, participants classified strings presented in the same modality as their training strings (letters/letters or tones/tones) or in the opposite modality (letters/tones or tones/ letters). There were two types of control groups who either received no training or who were trained on randomly generated sequences. The results suggested that prior exposure to the grammar led to accurate classification performance (same modality 56% correct, changed modality 54% correct), whereas control groups performed at chance (50%).
Although this experiment appears to provide evidence that changed modality groups used general, abstract, rule knowledge that goes beyond perceptual features, Redington and Chater (1996) demonstrated that participants could have used surface fragments of two or three letters to perform abstraction at test. Moreover, Gomez (1997) and Tunney and Shanks (2003) have presented strong evidence that such transfer is always accompanied by explicit knowledge: participants who achieved above-chance transfer scores also scored above-chance on tests of awareness in these experiments. Thus there is little evidence at present that transfer is mediated by implicit, abstract knowledge.
On the other hand, Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, and Vishton (1999) observed transfer in sevenmonth-old infants and it seems unlikely that they were aware of the rule structure of the materials presented to them. In this study, the infants were familiarized for 2 minutes to sequences of syllables (e.g. 'de-de-li') generated by a grammar and were then found to be able to discriminate in a habituation test between grammatical and ungrammatical syllable sequences even when they used different syllables. Thus if the grammar generated AAB sequences like the one above, the infants listened less to another AAB item like 'ba-ba-po' than to a more surprising sequence like ABB ('ba-po-po'). Marcus et al. (1999: 79) drew the following conclusion, very similar to Manza and Reber's: We propose that a system that could account for our results is one in which infants extract abstract algebra-like rules that represent relationships between placeholders (variables), such as 'the first item X is the same as the third item Y', or more generally, that 'item I is the same as item J'.
Marcus et al. drew the intuitive conclusion that discriminating between test sequences that bear no surface similarity to the study sequences must rely on knowledge of 'deep' structure and assumed that only 'algebra'-like rules could allow this to be achieved. The study, however, provoked an avalanche of criticism from researchers proposing ways -generally based on connectionist networks -in which the infants' behavior could be explained without reference to structured rules but rather in terms of statistical learning (Altmann, 2002; Christiansen, Conway, & Curtin, 2000; Christiansen & Curtin, 1999; McClelland & Plaut, 1999; Seidenberg & Elman, 1999; Sirois, Buckingham, & Shultz, 2000) (many of these are published alongside responses from Marcus). If Marcus et al. had presented compelling evidence for rule-learning in infants, then it would surely follow that adults too can acquire rules under similar conditions (e.g. in the artificial grammar learning task). And if adult learning in AGL experiments is partly dependent on rules, then the pervasive inability to articulate such rules would constitute powerful evidence for implicit learning. It would be rash to say that this debate has been settled one way or the other, but it is clear that the results of Marcus et al. are nothing like as convincing as originally thought, and hence have less clear implications for the implicit learning debate.
In a nutshell, performance in AGL experiments appears to be fully explained without the need to impute unconscious rule-learning; that being the case, participants' inability to verbally report the rules of the grammar is neither here nor there and certainly does not establish that learning was implicit or unconscious. By generalization, this problem with the information criterion undermines quite a few apparent examples of implicit learning. Consider Greenspoon's (case 2 above) demonstration that people can be shaped to produce plural nouns if each such word is reinforced by the experimenter saying 'umhmm'. In an elegant deconstruction of this study, Dulany (1961) proved that subjects were hypothesizing that reinforcement was contingent on generating a word in the same semantic category as the previous word. Although incorrect, this hypothesis was 'correlated' with the true one, in that if the person said 'emeralds' and was reinforced, then staying in the same semantic category meant they were more likely to produce another plural noun ('rubies') than if they shifted categories. Thus Dulany conjectured that participants (including Greenspoon's) in this experimental setting are perfectly aware of the contingency controlling their behavior, namely the contingency between staying in the same semantic category and reinforcement. They only appear to be unaware because the experimenter is looking for the wrong sort of belief.
Despite these caveats about the relationship between verbalization and learning, the belief that knowledge cannot always be verbally accessed has very powerful intuitive appeal. Probably the most persuasive evidence comes not from published research but from introspection, as there is nothing so powerful than our intuitions about our own cognitive processes. For instance, my own behavior in an SRT task is, introspectively, accompanied by almost no ability to verbalize my knowledge. In one version of this task that I perform frequently in the course of preparing experimental software, I react to a target across several blocks of trials in which a noisy sequence is used. Again there is a 12-element repeating sequence governing target locations. Instead of following a fixed sequence, each target appears according to the sequence with a probability of only 0.85. With probability 0.15, it appears in a location that violates the sequence (the precise details of the method can be found in Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998) . Because of this noise in the sequence, it is particularly difficult to verbally describe the sequence. However, my RTs are much faster to predictable targets than to unpredictable ones, implying that I 'know' the sequence. But trying to articulate my knowledge, even only moments after performing the task, seems to require a Herculean effort of mental will that yields only the sketchiest useful information. This cannot be attributed to a problem meeting the information criterion as there is no dispute that it is knowledge of the sequential dependences between the target locations that controls my RTs and that I am tying to access for verbalization.
But is such a finding really that surprising? I believe not. As long ago as the 1960s, memory researchers were aware of the possibility that information might be stored in explicit memory but not accessible in a given test. Tulving's distinction between accessibility and availability, with the latter referring to the potential for information to be retrieved under suitable retrieval conditions, precisely captures this idea, and considerable evidence was accumulated showing that information inaccessible in free recall can become available in appropriately cued recall (Tulving, 1983: 201-5; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) . Thus implicit knowledge may not be any different from explicit knowledge in this regard. Perhaps it is a property of all knowledgeexplicit, implicit, motor skills, and so on -that it can be inaccessible without being unavailable, and perhaps the retrieval cues provided by an implicit test serve exactly the same function as the sorts of cues used by Tulving in his classic explicit memory experiments. For instance, in performing the SRT task, sequence knowledge is accessed in the context of a dynamic task presenting certain visual (boxes on the display) as well as temporal cues (the Whittlesea and Price's (2001) experiments. Participants chose between a pair of test pictures according to which one they preferred or which one they recognized. In the standard case the classic result of Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) 
was replicated: old items were only selected under (implicit) preference conditions. Chance performance is 50% of old items selected. However, under modified conditions the reverse pattern was obtained, consistent with the analytic/non-analytic account. In the modified recognition condition, participants selected the picture they thought was globally similar to a study picture (a non-analytic decision) and in the modified preference condition they had to justify each choice by pointing to the quadrant of the picture they felt made it pleasant (an analytic decision).
immediately preceding target and response) for eliciting sequence knowledge, none of which is present in a later test of verbal sequence recall.
In this rather weak sense at least, no one can doubt the reality of implicit learning: knowledge can be inaccessible to free verbal recall. It could, of course, be argued that the cuing effect is due to a contribution of implicit processes in cued recall over and above those that contribute to free recall (Jacoby et al., 1993) . However, logic requires that the improvement of access with retrieval cues cannot both be explained by implicit influences and be used to justify the existence of such influences, nor can inaccessibility to verbal introspection and access be taken as evidence for implicit learning if such inaccessibility is also a property of explicit learning. To obtain independent evidence of implicit learning, we therefore need to look elsewhere.
Objective tests
As a reaction to these problems with evaluating the outcomes of subjective tests of awareness, attention has turned to objective tests and it has been widely accepted that such tests avoid some of the problems with subjective tests and possibly provide the best measures of awareness. An example of such a test was given in case 7 above, where awareness was assessed via a recognition test. That example concerns an individual with brain damage leading to amnesia, but there now exist a good number of cases where normal individuals can be shown to have acquired some information that influences their behavior in a certain context but where that information is insufficient to support recognition, cued recall or some other objective test. If we do not accept the implicit/ explicit distinction, if in our experiments we avoid problems associated with the information criterion, and if we interpret all failures of verbalization as problems of accessibility, then we would predict that sensitive tests such as recognition would not produce results that dissociate from implicit measures. Therefore the existence of such dissociations should provide particularly strong evidence for implicit learning.
A striking example of the way in which knowledge may be inaccessible on a recognition test but accessible on an almost identical implicit test is seen in studies of the 'mere-exposure effect'. In this procedure, stimuli such as geometrical figures are initially presented briefly (e.g. for 1 second). In a later test a pair of figures is shown side by side for an unlimited period, one being a previously seen one and the other being novel. Participants are either asked to select the old stimulus (i.e. recognition) or to make some judgment that does not refer to the previous exposure stage. For instance, in Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc's (1980) classic study participants made liking judgments. The striking result is that while objective recognition was almost impossible (participants were at chance), they were much more likely to choose the old than the new stimulus if making a liking judgment. This suggests that information can be available on an implicit test but not on a matched objective test of awareness. Presumably the old stimuli were processed slightly more fluently than the new ones as a result of priming, and under implicit test instructions participants inadvertently attributed this fluency to the pleasantness of the stimuli.
It has to be said that experimental reports of chance-level recognition in implicit learning experiments have not always proved easy to replicate. For example, Reed and Johnson (1994) reported chance-level recognition in an SRT experiment, but Shanks and Johnstone (1999) , in a replication, found very high levels of recognition under identical circumstances. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, that a participant might find a recognition memory test quite difficult and hence resort to guessing on each trial, thus generating performance no better than chance. Good experimental practice is to reward participants according to their performance in such tests to motivate them to perform at their best. The only reason Shanks and Johnstone were able to offer for the different results they obtained was that they provided performancerelated payoffs whereas Reed and Johnson did not.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this would account for all examples of null recognition (indeed the Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc finding has been replicated many times, e.g. Seamon et al., 1995) . Do such findings unequivocally point to the existence of an implicit learning mechanism? It is probably too early to say, but there are possible ways in which such a result might be explained without the need to posit a mechanism of this sort. Whittlesea and Price (2001) have suggested that a better account is that participants adopt different strategies for using the same memory representations in the two tests. This account proposes that a fluency-attribution heuristic is only one of a pair of strategies that participants can adopt whereby past experience is deployed in the service of current decisions. This heuristic, which might be used to explain participants' greater liking for the old member of each pair, is 'non-analytic' in the sense that participants are assumed to process a stimulus as a whole rather than analyzing it by its parts. If the whole item engenders a feeling of fluent or coherent processing, then an attribution process is recruited to find a suitable dimension in the environment (e.g. pleasantness) to which that fluent processing can be attributed. The other strategy, by contrast, is 'analytic' and involves examining the parts of which a stimulus is composed to see whether any of them acts as a cue for recalling details of the context in which the item was previously encountered. The assumption is that participants may shift the balance between these strategies and that in so doing the influence of processing fluency on current decisions may change. Critically, however, this distinction cuts across the implicit/ explicit distinction. Participants may adopt analytic processing in one version of a test and non-analytic processing in another but without the task changing in terms of its demands on implicit or explicit memory.
What reason is there to believe that participants may shift their decision strategies in implicit and explicit memory tests? Whittlesea and Price provide one compelling example within the context of the mere-exposure effect. Participants saw a continuous stream of pictures each presented for about 40 ms and in a subsequent test stage were shown pairs of pictures, one being from the study set (i.e. old) and the other being novel. Whittlesea and Price replicated the finding that participants under such circumstances tend to pick the old item when asked Shanks and Johnstone's (1999) to make a preference rating (see Figure 8 .4). They also found that when asked instead explicitly to select the old stimulus (i.e. recognition), participants were unable to do so, hence replicating the classic dissociation result of Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc. Whittlesea and Price proposed that participants normally adopted a non-analytic strategy under preference conditions but an analytic strategy under recognition conditions. In the former, participants would choose the item at test that evoked the greatest global feeling of 'goodness' and this would tend to be the true old item whose processing would be subtly more fluent than that of the novel item. In contrast, under recognition conditions participants would study each test item analytically in an attempt to find some discriminating detail diagnostic of a prior encounter with that item. Because the study items were presented so briefly and the test items were so similar to one another, this analytic strategy was doomed to failure.
To test this account, Whittlesea and Price attempted to reverse the mere-exposure effect, observing a tendency for the old stimulus now to be selected under recognition but not preference conditions. They achieved this by implementing two changes: first, in the preference condition participants were required to justify their decisions, which Whittlesea and Price assumed would evoke an analytic strategy; and secondly, in the recognition condition participants were asked to select the stimulus that was globally most similar to a study item, a change of instructions that Whittlesea and Price assumed would encourage non-analytic processing. The results, shown in Figure 8 .4, were consistent with these assumptions: old stimuli were now selected with higher probability under recognition than under preference conditions. It is hard to see how an account that proposes that recognition decisions are based on an explicit memory system and preference decisions on an implicit system would explain this crossover effect as the modified instructions did not change the implicit or explicit nature of the tests.
It is far too early to judge whether this account is adequate to explain cases of dissociation between implicit and explicit measures such as those used in the studies described above. have obtained some further supporting evidence from artificial grammar learning experiments, demonstrating again that participants can apparently be shifted from one strategy to the other, but just as it is important to seek independent evidence for an implicit learning process, so equally is it critical to obtain independent evidence for analytic and non-analytic processes. As yet the major evidence is circumstantial.
DISSOCIATIONS -AN INVENTION OF THE DEVIL
A very common practice in implicit learning research is to administer an implicit learning task followed by a test of explicit knowledge and then to select participants who performed at chance on the explicit test and study their performance on the implicit one (e.g. Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Burke & Roodenrys, 2000; Clark & Squire, 1998; Frensch, Lin, & Buchner, 1998; Gomez, 1997; Higham, 1997; Rugg et al., 1998; Seger, 1997; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989) . If implicit test performance is better than chance, then the researcher usually concludes that learning was genuinely implicit, as (at least for this subsample) there was no accompanying explicit knowledge. Putting aside all the previous caveats about suitable indices of awareness, I want in the present section to highlight some of the extreme dangers of relying on such dissociation results. Many previous papers critical of dissociations have been published (Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Ostergaard, 1992; Perruchet & Gallego, 1993; Plaut, 1995; Poldrack, 1996; Poldrack, Selco, Field, & Cohen, 1999) . The present section aims to add to this largely theoretical literature by providing an extremely simple but concrete illustration of how such dissociations can arise without needing to posit a separate implicit system.
The left panel of Figure 8 .5 plots data in this form from a study by Shanks and Johnstone (1999;  see also Shanks & Perruchet, 2002 ) and the precise details of the experiment can be found there. For present purposes, it suffices to know that in this experiment we obtained concurrent implicit and explicit measures of sequence knowledge in 79 participants who undertook an SRT experiment. After 17 training blocks of 100 trials of a 4-choice target detection task in which a repeating 12-element sequence was used, a test was administered. Here, there were 12 short old sequences (i.e. from the training sequence) and 12 short new sequences (not from the training sequence), which were randomly intermixed. Each of these items comprised 6 targets and participants executed each of these sequences prior to giving a recognition judgment on a six-point scale from certain new (1) to certain old (6). We expected, and found, that old sequences were executed faster than new ones (i.e. priming) to the tune of about 20 ms per target. We also found that participants could to some extent recognize the old sequences: recognition judgments were significantly greater for old than for new sequences (Shanks & Perruchet, 2002) .
The important result, though, is that the priming and recognition measures can be dissociated, and Figure 8 .5 reveals such a dissociation (Shanks & Perruchet, 2002, present another one) . Participants who performed at or below chance in the recognition test (all points below the horizontal diagonal) nonetheless showed priming. Points to the bottom left of the figure represent individual participants who showed priming but whose average recognition score was zero or less. This group as a whole shows significant priming (most points below the horizontal axis are also to the left of the vertical axis) without being able to recognize chunks of the training sequence.
What can we conclude from such results? I shall argue that any temptation to take these results as evidence for implicit learning is mistaken as they can be reproduced by a simple model that does not incorporate an implicit/ explicit distinction.
A model of priming and recognition
The model (Shanks & Perruchet, 2002; Shanks, Wilkinson, & Channon, 2003) , which is conceptually very similar to standard signal detection theory models for recognition judgments and their latencies (Pike, 1973; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976) , starts with the simple assumption that new and old test items are associated with a memory strength variable which we will call familiarity f. Greater degrees of familiarity lead to higher recognition judgments and faster RTs, and familiarity can be thought of as some composite but unidimensional function of the perceptual familiarity of the stimulus sequence and the motor fluency of the executed response sequence. In the model, f is a uniformly distributed random variable in the interval [0,0.8] for new items and in the interval [0.2,1] for old items. Thus the mean familiarity of old items, f old , is slightly higher (by 0.2) than the mean for new items, f new . For each participant a single value of familiarity is independently sampled for new and old items from these distributions. Next, we assume that RT is a decreasing function of f but with the addition of some random error:
where e is uniformly distributed random error in the interval [0, 1] . The numbers in these equations are simply chosen to ensure that RTs are generated between a maximum of 600 ms when the familiarity of the test item is zero and a minimum of 200 ms when familiarity is 1. These correspond roughly to observed response times. Recognition judgments (J) are also based on familiarity, but include another (independent) source of error:
where e is again uniformly distributed random error in the interval [0, 1] . J is rounded to the nearest integer value. These equations generate recognition ratings between a maximum of 6 when the familiarity of the test item approaches 1 and a minimum of 1 when familiarity is 0.
Despite the fact that RTs and recognition judgments depend on the same variable (f) in this model, and depend on nothing else apart from noise, the model nevertheless generates a pattern of data strikingly similar to that shown in the top panel of Figure 8 .5. The bottom panel of the figure presents the mean priming and recognition scores based on 79 simulated participants. For each simulated participant, I generated 12 values of f old and 12 values of f new which were then used to produce RTs and ratings according to the above equations. These old and new values were then averaged to yield a single priming/recognition data point for each simulated participant.
On average RTs are faster overall to old than new items (i.e. priming scores tend to be negative) and recognition ratings are generally positive, just as in the experimental data. Overall the pattern of the simulation results, while not perfectly reproducing the experimental data, is fairly similar (Shanks & Perruchet, 2002 , describe how this model captures another dissociation evident in this data set). More significantly, though, the model yields a number of data points in which recognition is at or below chance combined with a sizable degree of priming (in the lower left quadrant of the figure). But this is simply an automatic by-product of the fact that in the model the two measures are assumed to be affected by the random variation and measurement error that plague any experimental measure (i.e. the term e in the equations). More specifically, for old and new sequences to be rated equally in recognition, a larger value of e in equation (8.4) compared to equation (8.3) is necessary, on average, to offset the larger average value of f old compared to f new . However, when these same f values are used to determine RTs in equations (8.1) and (8.2), they will be combined with independently generated values of e. Since the latter are uncorrelated with the e values incorporated in the recognition judgments, on average they will not differ for old and new items. Hence, as f old is on average greater than f new , simulated participants in whom recognition ratings for old items is the same as or lower than those for new items will tend to be combined with RT old values that are lower than RT new , as observed empirically in the behavior of the selected subset of participants.
There have been many criticisms of conclusions that rely for their support on dissociation evidence. The example I have presented here extends this body of critical work simply by demonstrating how the incorporation of noise into a model can yield dissociations even though a common memory base underlies performance on both the explicit (recognition) and implicit (priming) tests. Noise and measurement error are facts of life and it is important that researchers begin to explore their implications in performance models, especially when concerned with behavioral dissociations and their potential conceptual significance.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
In this chapter I have concentrated on behavioral evidence concerning the relationship between implicit learning and attention and awareness and have said relatively little about formal models of implicit learning. However, the discussion in the last section should make it clear that models can play a very important role in helping us to understand learning processes, and indeed there has been a great deal of work trying to develop models for standard implicit learning tasks such as grammar learning and the SRT task. In much of this work issues of awareness and attention are often left to one side, the principal question being simply to try to account for fine-grained aspects of performance.
I shall not review progress in this area (examples and further references are contained in Cleeremans, 1993; Dienes, Altmann, & Gao, 1999; Kinder & Shanks, 2001 ) but shall merely emphasize one point that has some relevance to the issue of awareness. If it were the case that the most successful models of implicit learning were symbol-processing ones in which performance is explained in terms of the acquisition and usage of structured rules, then this would provide quite strong evidence for the implicit/explicit dichotomy for the following reason (see O'Brien & Opie, 1999; Shanks, 1997 , for a much more detailed exposition). It cannot be the case that the contents of consciousness are coextensive with information coded symbolically in rules as the brain would need to represent far more information in this way than would be available to consciousness. For example, a huge symbol-processing machinery comprising an endless number of rules would need to be employed in understanding language, and of course we have no conscious awareness of such machinery operating. Therefore it would have to be assumed that only certain privileged symbolic representations gain access to consciousness. The implicit/explicit distinction would then provide an appropriate characterization of these two distinct representational states.
The empirical force of this argument, however, is weak because by far the most successful models of implicit learning are ones based on distributed rather than symbolic representations (Cleeremans, 1993; O'Brien & Opie, 1999) . For example, recurrent connectionist network models of artificial grammar learning Kinder & Shanks, 2001 ) assume that knowledge is represented not via grammatical rules but in a large network of connections coding the statistical relationships between letters in different positions. In this case, it is no longer quite so obvious that a separation between implicit and explicit mental representations is necessary; instead it is possible to argue that there is only a single type of representation (i.e. distributed ones) and that what makes some representations conscious is not a special property but merely, for instance, their achieving some level of stability. A good deal of recent work on classic philosophical topics such as mental representation has taken consideration of the implicit/explicit distinction (e.g. Dienes & Perner, 1999; O'Brien & Opie, 1999) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research on implicit learning has provided a rich seam of new information concerning the processes that control learning and the relationships between learning, attention and awareness. In my view it has yet to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that there exists a form of learning that proceeds both unintentionally and unconsciously, yet it cannot be disputed that the examples described at the beginning of the chapter all possess a common 'essence' that marks them out from the more traditional varieties of (explicit) learning studied by psychologists. In attempting to understand this essence, much has been discovered: for example, that learning can be exquisitely tied to the processing systems that carry out a specific task (Karni, 1996) , that examples of abstract learning can often be understood in terms of very elementary processes (McClelland & Plaut, 1999) , and that even quite simple models can generate complex patterns of behavior. Whatever the final conclusion about the status of implicit learning, these discoveries will have enduring value.
In the Appendix I provide some brief comments on each of the examples I presented at the outset of this chapter. In some cases I argue that closer examination might lead to a re-evaluation of conclusions. In other cases the evidence for implicit learning appears stronger. NOTE 1 Here I am using the terms 'attention' and 'intention' as almost synonymous, which of course they are not. In a fuller treatment it would be necessary to distinguish between situations in which a person is not intending via a voluntary act of will to learn about some domain from those in which that person is not attending to a particular source of information.
